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Rechtsprechung zur Exportkontrolle

Regulation (EU) 2021/821 - Export Control

158 Fälle9 quelles15 rechtsordnungs73 ECN

97 reale Durchsetzungsfälle der Exportkontrolle, quellenbasiert und dokumentiert. Verwaltungssanktionen (BIS, BAFA), Strafverfolgungen, regulatorische Leitlinien (EU-Kommission, ECJU). Jeder Fall umfasst zitierte ECNs, verhängte Strafen und wichtige rechtliche Feststellungen.

Quelle

AlleNationale Gerichte53Bureau of Industry and Security (USA)38Europäische Kommission32BAFA (Deutschland)15SBDU (Frankreich)6ECJU (Vereinigtes Königreich)6Gerichtshof der Europäischen Union (EuGH)4OFAC (US-Finanzministerium)3ISP (Schweden)1

Rechtsordnung

AlleVereinigte Staaten59Europäische Union39Deutschland22Niederlande10Frankreich8Vereinigtes Königreich8Finnland2Spanien2Schweden2Estland1Lettland1Oesterreich1Dänemark1Belgien1Italien1

59 Fälle - Vereinigte Staaten

Alle
OFAC-UNKNOWN-YEAR-TO-DATE-TOTALSOFAC (US-Finanzministerium)Vereinigte Staaten
16 March 2026

Sanctions violation

OFAC enforcement action against Year to date totals:.

Zitierte ECNs:Keine spezifische ECN
BIS-2026-TELEDYNE-FLIRBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte Staaten
26 February 2026

Thermal imaging cameras

Teledyne FLIR self-disclosed 19 violations (2017-2024) involving de minimis miscalculations that undervalued US-origin content in Swedish-made cameras exported to China. In one case, the company negotiated a 'market collaboration fee' with a Chinese drone maker specifically to reduce the apparent US content below the 25% de minimis threshold. $1 million civil penalty imposed.

Zitierte ECNs:6A0036A993
Wichtige Feststellungen (3)
  • Manipulating de minimis calculations to artificially reduce US-origin content below 25% is treated as intentional evasion, not a technical classification error
  • Market collaboration fees or rebates designed to reduce apparent US content percentage are seen through by BIS investigators
  • Self-disclosure mitigated what could have been a much larger penalty - $1M for 19 violations involving thermal cameras to China is relatively restrained
OFAC-2026-AN-INDIVIDUALOFAC (US-Finanzministerium)Vereinigte Staaten
25 February 2026

Sanctions violation

OFAC enforcement action against An Individual.

Zitierte ECNs:Keine spezifische ECN
OFAC-2026-IMG-ACADEMY-LLCOFAC (US-Finanzministerium)Vereinigte Staaten
12 February 2026

Sanctions violation

OFAC enforcement action against IMG Academy, LLC.

Zitierte ECNs:Keine spezifische ECN
DOJ-2026-TFASA-ASWNationale GerichteVereinigte Staaten
15 January 2026

Anti-submarine warfare crew trainers / P-8 Poseidon mission simulators

DOJ filed forfeiture action against two mobile anti-submarine warfare crew trainers intercepted in transit from South Africa to the PLA. The trainers were designed to train Chinese aviators on ASW techniques against the P-8 Poseidon. Based on US-origin flight simulator software enhanced with Western ASW technical data. Entity List designation of TFASA in June 2023.

Zitierte ECNs:9A0047A003
Wichtige Feststellungen (3)
  • Military training simulators incorporating US-origin software are subject to US export controls regardless of where they are manufactured or assembled
  • Forfeiture actions can intercept controlled items in transit through third countries - no criminal conviction required to seize goods
  • Anti-submarine warfare training capability is classified as a strategic technology - simulators are controlled equivalently to the weapons systems they replicate
BIS-2025-LUMINULTRABureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte Staaten
1 October 2025

PhotonMaster luminometers and aqueous test kits

BIS settled with Luminultra Technologies for exporting three PhotonMaster luminometers and 25 aqueous test kits to Iran. Items were classified EAR99 but required authorization for Iran under Section 746.7(e). Civil penalty of $685,051 and 3-year suspended denial order imposed.

Zitierte ECNs:Keine spezifische ECN
Wichtige Feststellungen (3)
  • EAR99 items still require Iran-specific authorization - classification as non-controlled does not mean exportable everywhere
  • Water quality testing equipment (luminometers) can trigger export violations when shipped to comprehensively sanctioned countries
  • $685K penalty for 3 luminometers demonstrates disproportionate penalty structure for Iran violations - even low-value exports carry severe consequences
BIS-2025-HALLEWELLBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte Staaten
1 October 2025

Controlled technology items

Hallewell Ventures Ltd. entered into a Settlement Agreement with BIS, assessed a civil penalty of $374,474 - the maximum per-violation amount as of January 2025. The case demonstrated BIS's updated penalty guidelines linking penalties to transaction value.

Zitierte ECNs:Keine spezifische ECN
Wichtige Feststellungen (3)
  • Maximum per-violation penalty of $374,474 as of January 2025 - this amount is adjusted annually for inflation
  • BIS updated Administrative Enforcement Guidelines in 2024 link penalty determination directly to transaction value and violation circumstances
  • Even single-violation cases can result in maximum penalties when aggravating factors (willfulness, strategic destination) are present
DOJ-2025-CADENCEBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte Staaten
15 July 2025

EDA semiconductor design tools, hardware, and IP technology

Cadence pled guilty to criminal export control violations for selling EDA tools to China's National University of Defense Technology (NUDT), on the Entity List since 2015 for supercomputer support of nuclear simulation. Combined penalty of $140.6 million ($72M criminal fine + $45M forfeiture + $95M BIS civil penalty, cross-credited) with five years probation.

Zitierte ECNs:3D0015D002
Wichtige Feststellungen (3)
  • First major corporate criminal guilty plea for export control violations signals DOJ's willingness to pursue criminal prosecution of companies, not just individuals
  • Entity List designations from 2015 still actively enforced a decade later - companies cannot assume old designations are forgotten or unenforced
  • Five-year probation with annual compliance reports creates long-term government oversight extending far beyond the penalty payment
BIS-2025-APPLIED-MATERIALSBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte Staaten
15 February 2025

Ion implantation semiconductor manufacturing equipment

BIS imposed a $252.5 million civil penalty - the second-largest BIS penalty ever - on Applied Materials for shipping 56 ion implanter systems worth $126M to SMIC without licenses between March 2021 and June 2022. SMIC had been on the Entity List since December 2020. Items were partially built in the US, shipped to Korea for completion, then sent to China.

Zitierte ECNs:3B001
Wichtige Feststellungen (3)
  • Routing items through third countries (Korea) does not circumvent Entity List requirements - reexport controls apply regardless of where assembly is completed
  • $252.5M penalty (2x transaction value) demonstrates BIS willingness to impose maximum statutory penalties for semiconductor diversion to Entity List parties
  • DOJ and SEC investigations were closed without further action due to cooperation with BIS - settling with one agency can foreclose multi-agency prosecution
BIS-2025-HAASBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte Staaten
17 January 2025

CNC machine parts (gearboxes, magnetic encoder adapters)

BIS and OFAC imposed $2.5 million in combined civil penalties on Haas Automation for 41 violations of the EAR involving sales of CNC machine parts to Entity-Listed defense sector parties in China and Russia, including Beihang University and CETC 14. Parts were classified EAR99 but destined for entities on the Entity List servicing CNC machines potentially classifiable under 2B001.

Zitierte ECNs:2B001
Wichtige Feststellungen (3)
  • Even EAR99 spare parts require screening against Entity List - classification alone does not determine export legality
  • Sales through authorized distributors do not absolve the manufacturer of end-user screening obligations
  • CNC machine tools and parts remain high-priority enforcement targets for defense sector diversion
BIS-2024-YEARREVIEWBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte Staaten
31 December 2024

All controlled items (enforcement statistics)

BIS Export Enforcement 2024 Year in Review reported record enforcement activity including the $300M Seagate settlement, 26 Disruptive Technology Strike Force criminal cases, and expanded use of Temporary Denial Orders against procurement networks. BIS received 80% more Voluntary Self-Disclosures containing serious violations in 2023 than 2022.

Zitierte ECNs:Keine spezifische ECN
Wichtige Feststellungen (3)
  • 80% increase in voluntary self-disclosures indicates either increased compliance awareness or increased violation rates - likely both as sanctions expanded
  • Record penalty amounts ($300M Seagate, $51M Boeing) signal deterrence-focused enforcement strategy - penalties now rival antitrust in magnitude
  • Temporary Denial Orders used increasingly as preventive tool to immediately block suspected procurement networks before criminal proceedings conclude
BIS-2024-ENTITY-LIST-SEMIBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte Staaten
2 December 2024

Semiconductor and AI-related technology

BIS added over 140 entities to the Entity List in 2024, with a pronounced focus on semiconductor manufacturing, artificial intelligence development, and advanced computing entities in China. Additions included Chinese chip design companies, AI research institutes, and fabrication facilities, effectively cutting them off from US-origin technology across all EAR categories.

Zitierte ECNs:3A0013B0014A003
Wichtige Feststellungen (3)
  • Entity List is expanding at record pace - over 140 additions in a single year targeting semiconductor and AI ecosystem
  • Entity List applies to ALL EAR items, not just controlled items - even commercial-grade computers and standard software require license for Entity List parties
  • Chinese semiconductor ecosystem is the primary target - additions cover the full supply chain from design (fabless) to fabrication (foundry) to equipment suppliers
DOJ-2024-BHAMBHANI-LASERNationale GerichteVereinigte Staaten
15 September 2024

Laser welding machines

Massachusetts laser equipment salesman Sam Bhambhani and Russian national Maxim Teslenko indicted for conspiracy (2015-2021) to export laser welding machines to Rosatom's Ural Electromechanical Plant by falsifying export documentation. The equipment was intended for Russia's nuclear weapons program. Maximum 10 years per count.

Zitierte ECNs:6A0052B001
Wichtige Feststellungen (3)
  • Laser welding equipment destined for nuclear weapons facilities requires maximum scrutiny - even when classified as dual-use rather than military
  • Sales personnel with direct customer relationships can become conduits for illegal exports when compliance oversight is weak at the individual level
  • Rosatom subsidiaries involved in nuclear weapons production are designated enforcement targets - any transaction requires individual license
DDTC-2024-RTXBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte Staaten
15 August 2024

Defense articles, classified defense articles, aerospace technology

RTX Corporation (Raytheon) settled 750 AECA/ITAR violations (Aug 2017-Sep 2023) including unauthorized exports of classified defense articles, hand-carry exports to proscribed destinations, and classification failures. $200 million DDTC penalty ($100M suspended for compliance). Separately, Raytheon paid $950M to DOJ/SEC for related FCPA and export control schemes.

Zitierte ECNs:9A0049E003
Wichtige Feststellungen (3)
  • 750 violations over 6 years indicates systemic compliance failure - even major defense contractors can accumulate massive violation counts
  • Hand-carry of defense articles to proscribed destinations is actively prosecuted, not just formal shipments through freight channels
  • Combined DDTC + DOJ/SEC penalties exceeding $1.1B demonstrate that export control and anti-corruption violations are often interlinked
DOJ-2024-PETROVNationale GerichteVereinigte Staaten
15 August 2024

Microelectronics with military applications

Russian-German national Arthur Petrov used a Cyprus shell company (Astrafteros Technokosmos) to procure US-sourced microelectronics falsely claiming items were for fire security systems. Components were shipped to Electrocom in Russia, which supplies manufacturers of guided missiles, drones, and electronic warfare equipment recovered on the Ukrainian battlefield.

Zitierte ECNs:3A0013A991
Wichtige Feststellungen (3)
  • Cyprus-based shell companies are actively used as fronts for Russian military procurement - Cyprus is an identified transshipment risk jurisdiction
  • Components recovered from Russian military hardware in Ukraine have been traced back to specific procurement schemes - battlefield forensics drives enforcement
  • False end-use declarations claiming fire security or commercial use for military-grade microelectronics follow a documented evasion pattern
BIS-2024-INDIANA-UNIVBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte Staaten
24 June 2024

Genetically modified fruit flies (Drosophila with ricin A transgene)

BIS settled with Indiana University over 42 violations involving export of fruit flies genetically modified to produce a subunit of the controlled ricin toxin (1C351) to 30 institutions in 16 countries without required export licenses, from November 2017 to April 2021. No monetary penalty was imposed due to voluntary self-disclosure and cooperation.

Zitierte ECNs:1C351
Wichtige Feststellungen (3)
  • Biological materials containing transgenes of controlled toxins (1C351 - ricin) are controlled items regardless of their host organism - a fruit fly carrying a ricin transgene is an export-controlled item
  • Academic and research institutions are not exempt from dual-use export controls - stock centers must screen biological material shipments
  • Voluntary self-disclosure and immediate remediation can result in no monetary penalty - but a suspended denial order and compliance training requirements were imposed
BIS-2024-1760EBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte Staaten
15 May 2024

All EAR items (enforcement mechanism)

BIS increasingly uses Section 1760(e) denials to add parties to the Entity List based on evidence of involvement in proliferation activities or sanctions evasion, without requiring a full enforcement proceeding. This administrative mechanism allows rapid blocking of suspected procurement networks before they can acquire additional controlled items.

Zitierte ECNs:Keine spezifische ECN
Wichtige Feststellungen (3)
  • Entity List additions under Section 1760(e) do not require proof beyond reasonable doubt - administrative standard of evidence applies, allowing faster action
  • Entity List placement imposes a license requirement for ALL EAR items (not just controlled items) - even EAR99 goods require a license to Entity List parties
  • Exporters must screen all transactions against the Entity List in real-time - failure to check is not a defense, and ignorance of a party's Entity List status does not excuse the violation
DOJ-2024-MILLIPORESIGMABureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte Staaten
15 May 2024

Biochemical products

First-ever DOJ National Security Division declination under the Voluntary Self-Disclosure Program. A MilliporeSigma employee fraudulently ordered controlled biochemicals using a fake university affiliation; co-conspirators repackaged and shipped them to China. The company's rapid self-disclosure and extraordinary cooperation led DOJ to decline prosecution entirely. Individual employees pled guilty.

Zitierte ECNs:1C351
Wichtige Feststellungen (3)
  • First DOJ NSD declination demonstrates tangible benefits of voluntary self-disclosure - company avoided all criminal prosecution
  • Employee fraud schemes exploiting academic discount programs to procure controlled items represent an emerging insider threat vector
  • Rapid cooperation enabling law enforcement to disrupt active schemes earns maximum mitigation credit - speed of disclosure matters
BIS-2024-INTEGRABureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte Staaten
15 March 2024

Transistors and related semiconductor products

Integra Technologies sold approximately $6.67 million of transistors and related products to Russian end users between February 2023 and October 2023 without the requisite license, admitting to 94 violations of the EAR. BIS agreed to suspend $1.5 million of the penalty due to limited ability to pay.

Zitierte ECNs:3A001
Wichtige Feststellungen (3)
  • Electronic components (3A001) sold to Russia require individual export licenses since February 2022 sanctions - no license exceptions apply
  • 94 violations over 8 months indicates failure of internal compliance screening - volume and systematic nature are aggravating factors
  • Financial inability to pay can result in partial penalty suspension, but compliance obligations remain fully in force
DDTC-2024-BOEINGBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte Staaten
15 February 2024

Defense articles including aerospace technology

Boeing agreed to pay $51 million (with $24 million suspended for compliance improvements) for unauthorized exports of defense articles to China. The settlement required appointment of a Special Compliance Officer, two independent audits, and strengthened export compliance training programs.

Zitierte ECNs:9A0049E003
Wichtige Feststellungen (3)
  • Aerospace technology (Category 9) exports to China face maximum scrutiny - even inadvertent transfers by major defense contractors result in multi-million dollar penalties
  • Suspended penalty portions incentivize compliance investment - companies can reduce effective penalty by demonstrating improved compliance systems
  • Special Compliance Officers and independent audits are standard remediation requirements for significant export control violations
DOJ-2024-DTSFNationale GerichteVereinigte Staaten
1 February 2024

Sensitive technologies across multiple categories

The Disruptive Technology Strike Force, a joint DOJ/Commerce initiative, announced 26 criminal cases charging sanctions and export control violations related to transfer of sensitive technology to China, Russia, and Iran. Cases involved smuggling conspiracies, procurement networks, and technology transfer schemes across electronics, encryption, navigation, and aerospace categories.

Zitierte ECNs:3A0015A0027A0039A004
Wichtige Feststellungen (3)
  • Strike Force model combining DOJ prosecutors with BIS investigators represents new enforcement paradigm - criminal prosecution is now the default for willful export control violations involving strategic adversaries
  • 26 cases across multiple technology categories shows breadth of enforcement - no single ECN category is immune from criminal prosecution
  • China, Russia, and Iran are the three primary enforcement targets - exports to these destinations face presumption of denial and enhanced scrutiny
BIS-2024-VSD-ENHANCEMENTBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte Staaten
15 January 2024

All EAR items (compliance program guidance)

BIS released updated guidelines enhancing the Voluntary Self-Disclosure (VSD) program, providing stronger incentives for companies to report export control violations. Companies making timely, complete VSDs with corrective actions can receive up to 75% reduction in civil penalties, and BIS will generally not pursue criminal referral for self-disclosed violations.

Zitierte ECNs:Keine spezifische ECN
Wichtige Feststellungen (3)
  • Up to 75% penalty reduction for voluntary self-disclosure makes VSD the single most important compliance tool - timely disclosure dramatically reduces enforcement exposure
  • Criminal referral generally waived for self-disclosed violations - creating strong incentive to disclose rather than conceal export control breaches
  • Corrective action must accompany disclosure - simply reporting a violation without implementing compliance improvements does not qualify for full VSD mitigation
OFAC-2023-BINANCEBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte Staaten
21 November 2023

Virtual currency exchange services

OFAC imposed a $968 million settlement - historic in scale - on Binance for sanctions violations involving Iran, Syria, North Korea, and Russia from August 2017 to October 2022. The Cayman Islands-based exchange knowingly allowed US persons and sanctioned entities to use its platform, with senior management awareness.

Zitierte ECNs:Keine spezifische ECN
Wichtige Feststellungen (3)
  • Technology platforms providing access to sanctioned jurisdictions face export control enforcement even for non-physical goods - digital services are exports
  • Senior management knowledge combined with failure to self-disclose constitutes egregious conduct warranting maximum penalties
  • $968 million settlement demonstrates enforcement parity between traditional goods exports and digital/financial services in sanctions enforcement
BIS-2023-SEMICONDUCTOR-UPDATEBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte Staaten
17 October 2023

Advanced semiconductors and manufacturing equipment

BIS updated export controls on advanced computing and semiconductor manufacturing equipment, expanding restrictions to close loopholes in the October 2022 rules. Updates included lower performance thresholds for controlled chips, expanded equipment controls, and new restrictions on cloud computing access providing controlled computing power to Chinese entities.

Zitierte ECNs:3A0013B0014A003
Wichtige Feststellungen (3)
  • Semiconductor controls evolve rapidly - annual updates mean performance thresholds change frequently and exporters must continuously re-classify products
  • Cloud computing restrictions extend export controls to computing-as-a-service - providing AI training compute to restricted entities is now an export violation
  • Controls target both the chip (3A001) and the equipment to make it (3B001) - dual-track approach aims to prevent indigenous manufacturing capability development
DOJ-2023-IRAN-ELECTRONICSNationale GerichteVereinigte Staaten
15 September 2023

Electronic equipment and technology

A dual Iran/US citizen was sentenced to 30 months imprisonment for using UAE front companies to illegally export electronic equipment and technology to Iran, including to Iran's Central Bank. The prosecution demonstrated systematic use of shell companies to circumvent export controls on controlled electronics.

Zitierte ECNs:3A0015A002
Wichtige Feststellungen (3)
  • UAE front companies are the most common intermediary structure for Iran procurement networks - exporters must conduct enhanced due diligence for UAE-destination transactions involving sensitive electronics
  • Exports to Iran's Central Bank trigger both export control and sanctions violations - financial institutions in sanctioned countries are high-priority enforcement targets
  • 30-month prison sentence for individual violators demonstrates criminal enforcement against persons, not just corporate penalties
DDTC-2023-VTABureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte Staaten
15 August 2023

Defense articles and technical data (telecom)

VTA Telecom Corporations received 3-year administrative debarment for unauthorized exports and attempted exports of defense articles and technical data to Vietnam. Violations included willful conduct, false statements on end-use certificates, and were discovered during a DOJ investigation and search warrant execution.

Zitierte ECNs:5A0025E002
Wichtige Feststellungen (3)
  • Administrative debarment is the most severe non-criminal penalty - completely bars the company from US defense trade for the debarment period
  • False statements on end-use certificates are independently prosecutable offenses that trigger aggravating factor treatment in penalty calculations
  • Search warrant execution indicates criminal investigation threshold was met - civil administrative debarment was chosen as the enforcement tool but criminal prosecution remained available
DOJ-2023-DES-SOLTECHNationale GerichteVereinigte Staaten
20 July 2023

Power amplifiers, cybersecurity software

DES International (Taiwan) and Soltech Industry (Brunei) each received fines and 5-year corporate probation for conspiracy to export power amplifiers and cybersecurity software to Iran in violation of export controls and sanctions. The case demonstrated use of Asian intermediary companies to circumvent Iran export restrictions.

Zitierte ECNs:3A0015A002
Wichtige Feststellungen (3)
  • Corporate probation (5 years) for foreign companies demonstrates extraterritorial enforcement of US export controls - non-US companies transacting in US-origin items face US jurisdiction
  • Power amplifiers (3A001) and cybersecurity software (5A002/5D002) are high-priority enforcement items for Iran - combination of electronic hardware and software in a single case
  • Asian intermediary companies (Taiwan, Brunei) used as transshipment points - exporters must verify ultimate end-use beyond immediate customer
DOJ-2023-IRAN-MISSILENationale GerichteVereinigte Staaten
15 June 2023

Technology for ballistic missiles and UAVs

Five individuals from Iran, Turkey, and UAE were charged under the Arms Export Control Act and IEEPA for attempted export of technology for Iran's ballistic missile and UAV programs. The procurement network operated from 2005 to 2013, spanning nearly a decade before detection and prosecution.

Zitierte ECNs:7A0039A0049A105
Wichtige Feststellungen (3)
  • Ballistic missile technology (Category 9, MTCR items) is the highest enforcement priority for Iran-related cases - any export supporting missile capability triggers maximum penalties
  • Procurement networks spanning Iran, Turkey, and UAE represent typical geographic pattern - Turkey and UAE are primary intermediary countries for Iran technology acquisition
  • 8-year investigation timeline (2005-2013) demonstrates that complex procurement network cases require years of intelligence gathering before prosecution
BIS-2023-ARATOSBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte Staaten
9 June 2023

Critical technologies (procurement network)

BIS issued a Temporary Denial Order (TDO) suspending export privileges of the Aratos Group, a network of defense-related companies in the Netherlands and Greece, for acting as a procurement network for Russian intelligence services. The network procured items across multiple ECN categories for sanctioned end-users.

Zitierte ECNs:3A0015A0027A003
Wichtige Feststellungen (3)
  • Temporary Denial Orders can be issued pre-conviction to immediately block export privileges of suspected procurement networks
  • Procurement networks operating through EU-based companies to acquire US-origin controlled technology for Russian intelligence represent a major enforcement priority
  • Multi-jurisdictional networks spanning EU member states require coordinated US-EU enforcement response
DOJ-2023-BOGONIKOLOSNationale GerichteVereinigte Staaten
17 May 2023

Quantum computing equipment, military antennas, advanced electronics

Greek head of NATO contractor Aratos Group indicted for smuggling US-origin military technologies to Russian intelligence (SVR) and Military Unit 33949 since 2017. Technologies included quantum computing and nuclear testing equipment. He falsified end-use documentation claiming items were for 'recreational maritime vessels.' Arrested in France, extradition proceedings pending.

Zitierte ECNs:3A0014A005
Wichtige Feststellungen (3)
  • NATO contractors with security clearances can be exploited as procurement channels for adversary intelligence services - insider threat is real
  • False end-use statements claiming military items are for recreational use are a classic red flag pattern documented across multiple enforcement cases
  • Multi-country arrest and extradition proceedings (Greece-France-US) demonstrate international enforcement cooperation across NATO allies
DDTC-2023-ISLAND-PYROBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte Staaten
10 May 2023

Ammonium perchlorate (rocket propellant oxidizer)

Island Pyrochemical Industries Corp. paid $850,000 ($425,000 suspended for compliance) for unauthorized brokering of ammonium perchlorate from China to Brazil and making false license statements. A Special Compliance Officer was appointed with independent audit requirements.

Zitierte ECNs:1C111
Wichtige Feststellungen (3)
  • Rocket propellant precursors (ammonium perchlorate, 1C111) are controlled under MTCR - brokering from third countries still triggers US jurisdiction if the broker is a US person
  • Brokering activities (arranging transactions without physical possession) are independently controlled - intermediaries who never touch the goods can still violate export controls
  • $425,000 suspended portion incentivizes compliance investment - reduction contingent on demonstrated compliance improvements within specified timeframe
OFAC-2023-BATBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte Staaten
25 April 2023

Tobacco products, equipment, and services

British American Tobacco paid $508 million to OFAC and $629 million to DOJ for 16 violations of WMD/North Korea sanctions. BAT maintained a 60% stake joint venture enabling a billion-dollar cigarette industry in North Korea with willful conduct, senior management involvement, and active concealment.

Zitierte ECNs:Keine spezifische ECN
Wichtige Feststellungen (3)
  • Sanctions violations involving WMD-designated countries (North Korea) carry the highest penalties regardless of product type - tobacco is not dual-use but WMD sanctions apply broadly
  • Active concealment and senior management involvement are the most severe aggravating factors in sanctions enforcement
  • Combined DOJ/OFAC penalties can exceed $1 billion - demonstrating that sanctions enforcement now rivals antitrust in penalty magnitude
BIS-2023-SEAGATEBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte Staaten
19 April 2023

Hard disk drives

BIS imposed a $300 million civil penalty - the largest standalone BIS penalty ever - on Seagate Technology for 429 violations of the EAR. Seagate continued shipping millions of hard disk drives to Huawei after Huawei was placed on the Entity List, between August 2020 and September 2021.

Zitierte ECNs:5A992
Wichtige Feststellungen (3)
  • Settlement of $300M demonstrates severity of Entity List violations even for EAR99/5A992 classified items
  • Volume of violations (429 over 13 months) showed systematic disregard for export controls
  • Multi-year audit requirement imposed as part of settlement
BIS-OFAC-2023-MICROSOFTBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte Staaten
6 April 2023

Software licenses and services

Microsoft paid $3.3 million in combined BIS/OFAC penalties for over 1,300 violations involving provision of software and services to SDNs, blocked persons, and sanctioned jurisdictions through its foreign subsidiaries. The case was characterized as involving reckless disregard despite self-disclosure.

Zitierte ECNs:5D002
Wichtige Feststellungen (3)
  • Software licenses (5D category) are controlled exports - providing cloud services or software access to sanctioned entities violates export controls
  • Self-disclosure does not guarantee penalty reduction if conduct shows reckless disregard
  • Foreign subsidiaries' violations are attributable to the parent company under extraterritorial application of US export controls
BIS-DDTC-2023-3DSYSTEMSBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte Staaten
27 February 2023

Aerospace blueprints, military electronics, design documents

3D Systems Corporation was fined $2.7 million by BIS and $20 million by DDTC for multiple violations including illegal shipment of U.S.-origin aerospace blueprints and military electronics to China, and controlled design documents to Germany. The company continued exports after discovering its own violations.

Zitierte ECNs:3A0019E003
Wichtige Feststellungen (3)
  • Technology transfers (E-category items) are controlled equally as physical goods - blueprints and design data require same level of screening
  • Continued export after discovering violations constitutes aggravating factor leading to increased penalties
  • Joint BIS/DDTC enforcement demonstrates coordinated inter-agency approach to dual-use/military crossover items
DOJ-2023-DTSF-FORMATIONBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte Staaten
16 February 2023

All sensitive technologies (multi-agency enforcement)

DOJ and Commerce formed the Disruptive Technology Strike Force to target illicit acquisition of sensitive US technologies by nation-state adversaries, primarily China, Russia, and Iran. The Strike Force combines FBI agents, BIS investigators, and federal prosecutors into dedicated enforcement teams across 12 US metropolitan areas.

Zitierte ECNs:3A0015A0027A0039A004
Wichtige Feststellungen (3)
  • Strike Force model marks shift from reactive to proactive export control enforcement - dedicated teams actively investigate technology transfer networks
  • 12 metropolitan locations correspond to major technology and trade hubs - Silicon Valley, Boston, New York, Houston among priority areas
  • Criminal prosecution is the preferred enforcement tool for Strike Force cases - civil penalties reserved for less egregious violations, willful technology transfer gets criminal treatment
BIS-2022-QUICKSILVER-3DBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte Staaten
15 June 2022

Technical drawings for satellite, rocket, and defense prototypes

Three co-located 3D printing companies (Quicksilver Manufacturing, Rapid Cut, US Prototype) received controlled technical drawings from US customers to print prototypes, then without customer knowledge, sent the drawings to Chinese manufacturers for cheaper production. Items included satellite and rocket component blueprints. BIS issued Temporary Denial Order suspending all export privileges.

Zitierte ECNs:9E003
Wichtige Feststellungen (3)
  • Outsourcing manufacturing to China without customer consent or export authorization is a violation even when the physical goods are imported back to the US
  • 3D printing service providers are exporters when they transmit technical data internationally - the data transfer is the controlled export, not the physical part
  • TDOs can be issued immediately to prevent ongoing harm without waiting for full investigation - instant suspension of export privileges
DOJ-2021-THERMAL-RUSSIANationale GerichteVereinigte Staaten
15 June 2021

Thermal imaging scopes and night vision goggles

Five individuals were charged in a scheme to illegally export thermal imaging scopes and night vision goggles to Russia in violation of the Arms Export Control Act. The thermal imaging equipment (classifiable under 6A003 or USML) was procured in the US and shipped to Russia through intermediaries.

Zitierte ECNs:6A003
Wichtige Feststellungen (3)
  • Thermal imaging equipment (6A003) with military-grade specifications is among the most tightly controlled sensor items - export to Russia triggers both dual-use and ITAR restrictions
  • Procurement networks using intermediaries and transshipment points are the primary method for evading export controls on sensors - enforcement focuses on the supply chain
  • Night vision and thermal imaging are treated as equivalent in enforcement priority - both 6A002 (image intensifiers) and 6A003 (thermal) face maximum scrutiny for Russia destinations
DOJ-2021-THERMAL-NV-RUSSIANationale GerichteVereinigte Staaten
10 June 2021

Thermal imaging scopes and night vision goggles

Five individuals were charged with conspiracy to illegally export thermal imaging scopes and night vision goggles to Russia in violation of the Arms Export Control Act. The defendants operated a procurement network purchasing equipment in the US for transshipment to Russia through intermediary countries.

Zitierte ECNs:6A0026A003
Wichtige Feststellungen (3)
  • Thermal imaging (6A003) and night vision (6A002) equipment are dual-use items that also fall under ITAR when military-grade - exporters must determine if dual-use or military classification applies
  • Procurement networks for Russia specifically target night vision and thermal sensors - these are among the most actively smuggled dual-use items
  • Conspiracy charges apply to all participants in the supply chain - purchasers, shippers, and intermediaries all face criminal liability
BIS-2021-PHOTONICSBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte Staaten
15 May 2021

RGH-1064-30 picosecond laser systems

Photonics Industries International settled for $350,000 ($300K suspended) for exporting 25+ picosecond laser systems to China without licenses after misclassifying them as EAR99 instead of 6A005.b.6.b. The company also falsified EEI filings listing Hong Kong as the destination when true consignees were in China, including Entity-Listed Sichuan University.

Zitierte ECNs:6A005
Wichtige Feststellungen (3)
  • Product misclassification (6A005 vs EAR99) is one of the most common root causes of export violations - self-classification without guidance is high-risk
  • Listing Hong Kong as destination when China is the true end-use location is a documented red flag that triggers enhanced enforcement scrutiny
  • Absence of any export control compliance program including no restricted party screening is a significant aggravating factor in penalty determination
DDTC-2021-HONEYWELLBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte Staaten
13 May 2021

ITAR-controlled aerospace engineering drawings

Honeywell committed 34 AECA/ITAR violations by exporting engineering drawings to foreign suppliers in Canada, Mexico, Ireland, China, and Taiwan for quote requests without authorization (2011-2015). $13 million penalty ($5M suspended for compliance). Two voluntary disclosures submitted in 2016 and 2018.

Zitierte ECNs:9E003
Wichtige Feststellungen (3)
  • Sending engineering drawings to foreign suppliers even for quote or bidding purposes constitutes an export requiring authorization
  • Request-for-quote processes must be integrated into export compliance workflows - procurement teams need compliance training
  • Voluntary self-disclosure mitigated but did not eliminate penalties - $13M demonstrates significant consequences even with full cooperation
DOJ-2021-SAPBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte Staaten
29 April 2021

Software products and cloud services

SAP admitted to thousands of illegal software exports to Iran over 7 years (2011-2017), including approximately 2,360 Iranian users accessing US-based cloud services. SAP acquired companies with inadequate compliance programs and failed to integrate them. $8 million combined penalty plus $27 million spent on compliance remediation. First Non-Prosecution Agreement under DOJ's revised VSD Policy.

Zitierte ECNs:5D002
Wichtige Feststellungen (3)
  • Cloud services accessed by sanctioned-country users constitute exports under EAR - geo-blocking and user screening are mandatory compliance requirements
  • Acquirers inherit export control liability from acquired companies - pre-acquisition due diligence must include export compliance assessment
  • First NPA under DOJ's revised VSD Policy demonstrates substantial credit for voluntary disclosure plus $27M remediation investment
BIS-2021-ENC-MASSMARKETBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte Staaten
6 April 2021

Mass-market encryption items (regulatory guidance)

BIS clarified that hardware and software items meeting Note 3 mass-market criteria are classified as 5A992.c and 5D992.c rather than 5A002/5D002, removing most licensing requirements. Key criteria include: sold at retail without restriction, crypto not user-modifiable, user-installable, and designed for broad consumer market. Items like consumer routers, VPN software, and smartphones typically qualify.

Zitierte ECNs:5A0025D0025A992
Wichtige Feststellungen (3)
  • Mass-market crypto items reclassify from 5A002 to 5A992 - this is a classification shift, not an exemption, meaning the item is genuinely not controlled under 5A002
  • Routers where encryption serves only operations/administration/maintenance (OAM) functions are excluded from 5A002 under a separate decontrol note - OAM crypto is not the same as mass-market
  • Network infrastructure products, encryption source code, general-purpose crypto toolkits, and cryptanalytic items never qualify for mass-market treatment regardless of retail availability
BIS-2021-PRINCETONBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte Staaten
15 February 2021

Animal pathogen strains and recombinants

Princeton University settled 37 violations for exporting controlled pathogen strains (Nov 2013-Mar 2018) to overseas research institutions in 16 countries without required licenses. Items controlled for Chemical and Biological Weapons reasons under 1C351. $54,000 penalty plus audit requirements. Self-disclosed during 2018 compliance training.

Zitierte ECNs:1C351
Wichtige Feststellungen (3)
  • Research pathogens controlled under 1C351 require export licenses regardless of the scientific or academic nature of the transfer
  • Voluntary self-disclosure during internal compliance training demonstrates good faith and significantly mitigates penalties - $54K vs potential millions
  • Universities must screen biological material shipments against export control lists with the same rigor as commercial entities
DDTC-2020-L3HARRISBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte Staaten
15 June 2020

Defense articles and technical data

L3Harris Technologies settled AECA/ITAR violations under a 36-month Consent Agreement requiring external audit and enhanced compliance measures. $13 million penalty for violations involving unauthorized exports of defense articles resulting from classification errors and licensing failures during the L3 Technologies-Harris Corporation merger integration.

Zitierte ECNs:5A0026A003
Wichtige Feststellungen (3)
  • Defense industry consolidation through mergers creates compliance integration challenges - acquired product lines may have different classification histories
  • $13M penalty for a major defense contractor demonstrates DDTC enforces against the largest companies without exception
  • 36-month consent agreements with external audit requirements create extended compliance oversight beyond the initial settlement
DOJ-2019-POURGHANNAD-CARBONNationale GerichteVereinigte Staaten
15 November 2019

Carbon fiber (aerospace/weapons grade)

Iranian national Behzad Pourghannad sentenced to 46 months federal prison for conspiracy to procure carbon fiber from the US and divert it to Iran through third countries (2008-2013). Iran planned to use the material for centrifuge rotors and ballistic missile nose cones. Arrested in Germany in 2017, extradited to US.

Zitierte ECNs:1C010
Wichtige Feststellungen (3)
  • Carbon fiber (1C010) destined for Iran's missile and nuclear programs is a top enforcement priority - centrifuge rotors and missile nose cones require high-grade fiber
  • Arrest in Germany and extradition to the US demonstrates transatlantic enforcement cooperation in proliferation cases
  • 46-month sentence for a procurement facilitator reflects the seriousness of WMD-related material diversion
DOJ-2019-OCEANWORKSNationale GerichteVereinigte Staaten
15 September 2019

Navy submarine rescue diving recompression system technical data

Canadian Navy contractor OceanWorks International and president Glen Omer Viau pled guilty to concealing transfer of US Navy submarine rescue technical data to China's PLA. $84,000 company fine plus $25,000 individual fine. OceanWorks held the contract for the Navy's SRDRS submarine rescue system and misrepresented data transfers to Commerce.

Zitierte ECNs:8A001
Wichtige Feststellungen (3)
  • Navy contractors with access to submarine technology have unique knowledge that adversaries actively seek to acquire through legitimate business channels
  • Concealing the nature of technology transfers from the Commerce Department constitutes a separate criminal offense beyond the underlying export violation
  • Canadian companies operating as US government contractors are fully subject to US export controls - no foreign company exemption for defense contracts
DDTC-2018-FLIRBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte Staaten
24 April 2018

Infrared cameras and thermal imaging defense articles

FLIR Systems committed 347 ITAR violations including 219 counts of unauthorized deemed exports to dual-national employees from Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, and Cuba, plus 106 license management failures and 20 counts of failing to disclose payments. $30 million penalty ($15M suspended for compliance remediation). One of the largest deemed export enforcement cases in history.

Zitierte ECNs:6A003
Wichtige Feststellungen (3)
  • 219 deemed export violations from sharing ITAR data with foreign-national employees shows the systemic risk when access controls are not nationality-based
  • Deemed export rules apply to sharing controlled technical data with foreign nationals working in the US - no physical border crossing needed
  • Companies must screen employees' nationalities against sanctioned and embargoed countries before granting access to controlled technical data
DOJ-2017-SUN-CARBON-FIBERNationale GerichteVereinigte Staaten
15 April 2017

High-grade carbon fiber

Chinese national Fuyi Sun sentenced to 3 years federal prison for violating IEEPA by attempting to illegally export high-grade carbon fiber to China without a license. The carbon fiber has primary applications in aerospace and military sectors including missile and aircraft construction.

Zitierte ECNs:1C010
Wichtige Feststellungen (3)
  • Chinese nationals operating within the US who attempt to procure controlled materials face significant prison sentences - 3 years for attempted export
  • Carbon fiber remains one of the most frequently intercepted controlled materials in export enforcement - high demand from adversary countries
  • Attempted export carries the same criminal penalties as completed export - interception before shipment does not reduce sentencing
DOJ-2017-ZTEBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte Staaten
22 March 2017

Telecommunications equipment and components

ZTE illegally shipped US-origin telecom equipment to Iran and North Korea, then obstructed justice by lying to investigators and failing to discipline employees involved. The $1.19 billion combined penalty (DOJ + BIS + OFAC) was the largest ever for export control violations at the time. A $300M suspended portion was later activated in 2018 when ZTE violated settlement terms by lying about employee discipline.

Zitierte ECNs:5A001
Wichtige Feststellungen (3)
  • $1.19B was the largest export control penalty in history - setting a new benchmark for enforcement severity that stood until Seagate
  • Obstruction of investigation and failure to discipline responsible employees triggered activation of the $300M suspended penalty
  • Settlement agreement violations (lying about employee discipline) prove that post-settlement compliance is actively monitored and penalties can escalate
OFAC-2014-EPSILONBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte Staaten
15 July 2014

Auto audio equipment (Power Acoustik, Soundstream brands)

Epsilon Electronics sold $3.5 million in car audio equipment to Iran through a Dubai-based distributor (Asra International). The D.C. Circuit Court remanded the case in 2017, questioning OFAC's broad interpretation of transshipment prohibitions. OFAC rescinded the original penalty and entered a reduced $1.5 million settlement. Landmark case testing the boundaries of 'reason to know' in sanctions enforcement.

Zitierte ECNs:Keine spezifische ECN
Wichtige Feststellungen (3)
  • Landmark judicial challenge to OFAC - D.C. Circuit scrutinized OFAC's broad interpretation of transshipment, establishing limits on 'reason to know' standard
  • Even consumer electronics like car audio are subject to the comprehensive Iran embargo - there is no de minimis exception for non-technical goods
  • Dubai-based distributors create presumptive Iran transshipment risk - exporters must conduct enhanced due diligence for UAE-destination transactions
DOJ-2014-LI-FANGWEINationale GerichteVereinigte Staaten
29 April 2014

Gyroscopes, accelerometers, graphite cylinders, ultra-high strength steel

Li Fangwei operated a vast network of front companies in eastern China through LIMMT Economic and Trade Company to procure materials for Iran's ballistic missile program. OFAC designated LIMMT in 2006 and Li personally in 2009. The US offered a $5 million reward for information leading to arrest. Indictment carries maximum 175 years imprisonment for charges including bank fraud and sanctions violations.

Zitierte ECNs:7A0030C004
Wichtige Feststellungen (3)
  • Procurement networks using dozens of front companies can operate for years before detection - persistent shell company creation is the primary evasion technique
  • $5M bounty demonstrates the severity with which the US treats WMD proliferation procurement - equivalent to terrorism rewards
  • Chinese-based proliferation networks servicing Iran's missile program remain a top enforcement priority two decades after initial designation
DOJ-2013-GROMACKI-CARBONNationale GerichteVereinigte Staaten
15 November 2013

T-700 high-grade carbon fiber

US citizen Peter Gromacki sentenced to 3 months federal prison for systematically transshipping US-made T-700 carbon fiber to China over six years (2006-2012). T-700 carbon fiber has aerospace and nuclear engineering applications. Despite the long duration, the relatively light sentence reflected cooperation with investigators.

Zitierte ECNs:1C010
Wichtige Feststellungen (3)
  • T-700 carbon fiber is controlled for national security due to aerospace, nuclear, and missile applications - one of the most restricted composite materials
  • Six-year duration of systematic illegal exports demonstrates the difficulty of detecting transshipment schemes without intelligence tips
  • Cooperation with investigators significantly reduced the sentence - 3 months for 6 years of violations reflects maximum mitigation credit
DOJ-2009-HANSON-DRONESNationale GerichteVereinigte Staaten
15 February 2009

Drone autopilots

Married couple Yaming Nina Qi Hanson and Harold Dewitt Hanson indicted for conspiracy to illegally export 20 drone autopilots ($90,340) to China. Nina physically hand-carried autopilots in a suitcase through Germany to an associate who transported them to Xi'an, China. 105 days jail plus 15-year export ban for both defendants.

Zitierte ECNs:7A003
Wichtige Feststellungen (3)
  • Physical hand-carry of controlled items through third countries in personal luggage is a documented smuggling technique requiring customs vigilance
  • Drone/UAV autopilots (7A003) are among the most sensitive dual-use items due to direct military applications in autonomous weapons systems
  • Family-based export networks using husband-wife teams are a documented pattern enabling division of procurement and smuggling roles
DOJ-2008-ROTH-UNIVERSITYNationale GerichteVereinigte Staaten
3 September 2008

Plasma actuator technology for drone wings

Retired University of Tennessee professor John Reece Roth convicted on 18 counts for sharing ITAR-controlled plasma technology (designed for Air Force drone wings) with Chinese and Iranian graduate students without authorization. First major deemed export prosecution of a university professor. At age 72, sentenced to 4 years federal prison. Supreme Court declined review.

Zitierte ECNs:9E003
Wichtige Feststellungen (3)
  • Landmark deemed export prosecution - sharing controlled defense technology with foreign students in a US lab constitutes an illegal export
  • University researchers bear personal criminal liability for deemed export violations - the institution's oversight failure does not shield the individual
  • Age and academic status provide no immunity from prosecution - a 72-year-old professor received 4 years in federal prison
BIS-2007-NALCOBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte Staaten
15 June 2007

Water hardness testing kits containing triethanolamine

Nalco Company fined $115,000 for 13 unlicensed exports of water testing kits containing triethanolamine, a chemical weapons precursor classified under ECCN 1C395 (mixtures containing 30%+ of 1C350 precursors). Exports went to non-CWC member countries (Bahamas, Dominican Republic, Angola).

Zitierte ECNs:1C3501C395
Wichtige Feststellungen (3)
  • Chemical weapons precursors embedded in otherwise benign products like testing kits remain controlled - the peaceful purpose does not eliminate the license requirement
  • Non-Chemical Weapons Convention member countries require individual licenses for 1C395 items even for purely industrial applications
  • Classification nuances between 1C350 (pure precursors) and 1C395 (mixtures above 30%) can trap companies that do not analyze mixture thresholds
BIS-2007-UMASSBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte Staaten
15 June 2007

Atmospheric sensing device, antennae, and cables

University of Massachusetts at Lowell exported an atmospheric testing device ($191,870) and antennae/cables ($12,480) to SUPARCO, Pakistan's space agency which was on the Entity List due to missile proliferation concerns. Both items were classified EAR99 but required licenses because of the Entity-Listed end user. $100,000 suspended penalty.

Zitierte ECNs:Keine spezifische ECN
Wichtige Feststellungen (3)
  • EAR99 items still require licenses when the end user is on the Entity List - classification alone never determines export legality
  • Pakistan's SUPARCO is Entity-Listed due to missile proliferation concerns - all exports to SUPARCO require individual BIS licenses
  • University space science partnerships can inadvertently support missile programs - academic cooperation with listed entities requires export compliance review
BIS-2001-SIGMA-ALDRICHBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte Staaten
15 June 2001

Biological toxins

Sigma-Aldrich paid $1.76 million for illegal exports of biological toxins after acquiring Research Biochemicals Limited Partnership in 1997 and continuing its unlicensed exports for over a year. One of the largest biological toxin export penalties ever imposed. BIS established successor liability precedent.

Zitierte ECNs:1C351
Wichtige Feststellungen (3)
  • Successor liability applies - acquirers of companies with ongoing export violations inherit the liability and must immediately remediate upon discovery
  • Biological toxin exports (1C351) carry enhanced penalties due to biological weapons concerns even when no military end-use is proven
  • Post-acquisition compliance due diligence must include immediate review of export activities - a one-year delay in discovering violations is inexcusable
INTL-1987-TOSHIBA-KONGSBERGNationale GerichteVereinigte Staaten
1 June 1987

Computer-guided propeller milling machines

Toshiba Machine (Japan) supplied eight computer-guided milling machines to the Soviet Union, combined with Kongsberg Vaapenfabrikk (Norway) numerical controls, enabling the Soviets to machine dramatically quieter submarine propellers. This violated CoCom restrictions. Two senior executives were arrested and prosecuted. The scandal led to US import sanctions on Toshiba products and directly catalyzed reform of multilateral export controls.

Zitierte ECNs:2B001
Wichtige Feststellungen (3)
  • Landmark case that transformed export control enforcement - directly led to strengthening of CoCom and eventually the creation of the Wassenaar Arrangement
  • Submarine quieting technology via precision milling demonstrates how seemingly mundane machine tools (2B001) can provide decisive military advantage
  • US import sanctions on the parent company's products created economic pressure far exceeding any direct fines - affecting Toshiba's entire US business

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