OFAC-UNKNOWN-YEAR-TO-DATE-TOTALSOFAC (US-Finanzministerium)Vereinigte StaatenSanctions violation
OFAC enforcement action against Year to date totals:.
Regulation (EU) 2021/821 - Export Control
97 reale Durchsetzungsfälle der Exportkontrolle, quellenbasiert und dokumentiert. Verwaltungssanktionen (BIS, BAFA), Strafverfolgungen, regulatorische Leitlinien (EU-Kommission, ECJU). Jeder Fall umfasst zitierte ECNs, verhängte Strafen und wichtige rechtliche Feststellungen.
Quelle
59 Fälle - Vereinigte Staaten
AlleOFAC-UNKNOWN-YEAR-TO-DATE-TOTALSOFAC (US-Finanzministerium)Vereinigte StaatenSanctions violation
OFAC enforcement action against Year to date totals:.
BIS-2026-TELEDYNE-FLIRBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte StaatenThermal imaging cameras
Teledyne FLIR self-disclosed 19 violations (2017-2024) involving de minimis miscalculations that undervalued US-origin content in Swedish-made cameras exported to China. In one case, the company negotiated a 'market collaboration fee' with a Chinese drone maker specifically to reduce the apparent US content below the 25% de minimis threshold. $1 million civil penalty imposed.
OFAC-2026-AN-INDIVIDUALOFAC (US-Finanzministerium)Vereinigte StaatenSanctions violation
OFAC enforcement action against An Individual.
OFAC-2026-IMG-ACADEMY-LLCOFAC (US-Finanzministerium)Vereinigte StaatenSanctions violation
OFAC enforcement action against IMG Academy, LLC.
DOJ-2026-TFASA-ASWNationale GerichteVereinigte StaatenAnti-submarine warfare crew trainers / P-8 Poseidon mission simulators
DOJ filed forfeiture action against two mobile anti-submarine warfare crew trainers intercepted in transit from South Africa to the PLA. The trainers were designed to train Chinese aviators on ASW techniques against the P-8 Poseidon. Based on US-origin flight simulator software enhanced with Western ASW technical data. Entity List designation of TFASA in June 2023.
BIS-2025-LUMINULTRABureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte StaatenPhotonMaster luminometers and aqueous test kits
BIS settled with Luminultra Technologies for exporting three PhotonMaster luminometers and 25 aqueous test kits to Iran. Items were classified EAR99 but required authorization for Iran under Section 746.7(e). Civil penalty of $685,051 and 3-year suspended denial order imposed.
BIS-2025-HALLEWELLBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte StaatenControlled technology items
Hallewell Ventures Ltd. entered into a Settlement Agreement with BIS, assessed a civil penalty of $374,474 - the maximum per-violation amount as of January 2025. The case demonstrated BIS's updated penalty guidelines linking penalties to transaction value.
DOJ-2025-CADENCEBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte StaatenEDA semiconductor design tools, hardware, and IP technology
Cadence pled guilty to criminal export control violations for selling EDA tools to China's National University of Defense Technology (NUDT), on the Entity List since 2015 for supercomputer support of nuclear simulation. Combined penalty of $140.6 million ($72M criminal fine + $45M forfeiture + $95M BIS civil penalty, cross-credited) with five years probation.
BIS-2025-APPLIED-MATERIALSBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte StaatenIon implantation semiconductor manufacturing equipment
BIS imposed a $252.5 million civil penalty - the second-largest BIS penalty ever - on Applied Materials for shipping 56 ion implanter systems worth $126M to SMIC without licenses between March 2021 and June 2022. SMIC had been on the Entity List since December 2020. Items were partially built in the US, shipped to Korea for completion, then sent to China.
BIS-2025-HAASBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte StaatenCNC machine parts (gearboxes, magnetic encoder adapters)
BIS and OFAC imposed $2.5 million in combined civil penalties on Haas Automation for 41 violations of the EAR involving sales of CNC machine parts to Entity-Listed defense sector parties in China and Russia, including Beihang University and CETC 14. Parts were classified EAR99 but destined for entities on the Entity List servicing CNC machines potentially classifiable under 2B001.
BIS-2024-YEARREVIEWBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte StaatenAll controlled items (enforcement statistics)
BIS Export Enforcement 2024 Year in Review reported record enforcement activity including the $300M Seagate settlement, 26 Disruptive Technology Strike Force criminal cases, and expanded use of Temporary Denial Orders against procurement networks. BIS received 80% more Voluntary Self-Disclosures containing serious violations in 2023 than 2022.
BIS-2024-ENTITY-LIST-SEMIBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte StaatenSemiconductor and AI-related technology
BIS added over 140 entities to the Entity List in 2024, with a pronounced focus on semiconductor manufacturing, artificial intelligence development, and advanced computing entities in China. Additions included Chinese chip design companies, AI research institutes, and fabrication facilities, effectively cutting them off from US-origin technology across all EAR categories.
DOJ-2024-BHAMBHANI-LASERNationale GerichteVereinigte StaatenLaser welding machines
Massachusetts laser equipment salesman Sam Bhambhani and Russian national Maxim Teslenko indicted for conspiracy (2015-2021) to export laser welding machines to Rosatom's Ural Electromechanical Plant by falsifying export documentation. The equipment was intended for Russia's nuclear weapons program. Maximum 10 years per count.
DDTC-2024-RTXBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte StaatenDefense articles, classified defense articles, aerospace technology
RTX Corporation (Raytheon) settled 750 AECA/ITAR violations (Aug 2017-Sep 2023) including unauthorized exports of classified defense articles, hand-carry exports to proscribed destinations, and classification failures. $200 million DDTC penalty ($100M suspended for compliance). Separately, Raytheon paid $950M to DOJ/SEC for related FCPA and export control schemes.
DOJ-2024-PETROVNationale GerichteVereinigte StaatenMicroelectronics with military applications
Russian-German national Arthur Petrov used a Cyprus shell company (Astrafteros Technokosmos) to procure US-sourced microelectronics falsely claiming items were for fire security systems. Components were shipped to Electrocom in Russia, which supplies manufacturers of guided missiles, drones, and electronic warfare equipment recovered on the Ukrainian battlefield.
BIS-2024-INDIANA-UNIVBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte StaatenGenetically modified fruit flies (Drosophila with ricin A transgene)
BIS settled with Indiana University over 42 violations involving export of fruit flies genetically modified to produce a subunit of the controlled ricin toxin (1C351) to 30 institutions in 16 countries without required export licenses, from November 2017 to April 2021. No monetary penalty was imposed due to voluntary self-disclosure and cooperation.
BIS-2024-1760EBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte StaatenAll EAR items (enforcement mechanism)
BIS increasingly uses Section 1760(e) denials to add parties to the Entity List based on evidence of involvement in proliferation activities or sanctions evasion, without requiring a full enforcement proceeding. This administrative mechanism allows rapid blocking of suspected procurement networks before they can acquire additional controlled items.
DOJ-2024-MILLIPORESIGMABureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte StaatenBiochemical products
First-ever DOJ National Security Division declination under the Voluntary Self-Disclosure Program. A MilliporeSigma employee fraudulently ordered controlled biochemicals using a fake university affiliation; co-conspirators repackaged and shipped them to China. The company's rapid self-disclosure and extraordinary cooperation led DOJ to decline prosecution entirely. Individual employees pled guilty.
BIS-2024-INTEGRABureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte StaatenTransistors and related semiconductor products
Integra Technologies sold approximately $6.67 million of transistors and related products to Russian end users between February 2023 and October 2023 without the requisite license, admitting to 94 violations of the EAR. BIS agreed to suspend $1.5 million of the penalty due to limited ability to pay.
DDTC-2024-BOEINGBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte StaatenDefense articles including aerospace technology
Boeing agreed to pay $51 million (with $24 million suspended for compliance improvements) for unauthorized exports of defense articles to China. The settlement required appointment of a Special Compliance Officer, two independent audits, and strengthened export compliance training programs.
DOJ-2024-DTSFNationale GerichteVereinigte StaatenSensitive technologies across multiple categories
The Disruptive Technology Strike Force, a joint DOJ/Commerce initiative, announced 26 criminal cases charging sanctions and export control violations related to transfer of sensitive technology to China, Russia, and Iran. Cases involved smuggling conspiracies, procurement networks, and technology transfer schemes across electronics, encryption, navigation, and aerospace categories.
BIS-2024-VSD-ENHANCEMENTBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte StaatenAll EAR items (compliance program guidance)
BIS released updated guidelines enhancing the Voluntary Self-Disclosure (VSD) program, providing stronger incentives for companies to report export control violations. Companies making timely, complete VSDs with corrective actions can receive up to 75% reduction in civil penalties, and BIS will generally not pursue criminal referral for self-disclosed violations.
OFAC-2023-BINANCEBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte StaatenVirtual currency exchange services
OFAC imposed a $968 million settlement - historic in scale - on Binance for sanctions violations involving Iran, Syria, North Korea, and Russia from August 2017 to October 2022. The Cayman Islands-based exchange knowingly allowed US persons and sanctioned entities to use its platform, with senior management awareness.
BIS-2023-SEMICONDUCTOR-UPDATEBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte StaatenAdvanced semiconductors and manufacturing equipment
BIS updated export controls on advanced computing and semiconductor manufacturing equipment, expanding restrictions to close loopholes in the October 2022 rules. Updates included lower performance thresholds for controlled chips, expanded equipment controls, and new restrictions on cloud computing access providing controlled computing power to Chinese entities.
DOJ-2023-IRAN-ELECTRONICSNationale GerichteVereinigte StaatenElectronic equipment and technology
A dual Iran/US citizen was sentenced to 30 months imprisonment for using UAE front companies to illegally export electronic equipment and technology to Iran, including to Iran's Central Bank. The prosecution demonstrated systematic use of shell companies to circumvent export controls on controlled electronics.
DDTC-2023-VTABureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte StaatenDefense articles and technical data (telecom)
VTA Telecom Corporations received 3-year administrative debarment for unauthorized exports and attempted exports of defense articles and technical data to Vietnam. Violations included willful conduct, false statements on end-use certificates, and were discovered during a DOJ investigation and search warrant execution.
DOJ-2023-DES-SOLTECHNationale GerichteVereinigte StaatenPower amplifiers, cybersecurity software
DES International (Taiwan) and Soltech Industry (Brunei) each received fines and 5-year corporate probation for conspiracy to export power amplifiers and cybersecurity software to Iran in violation of export controls and sanctions. The case demonstrated use of Asian intermediary companies to circumvent Iran export restrictions.
DOJ-2023-IRAN-MISSILENationale GerichteVereinigte StaatenTechnology for ballistic missiles and UAVs
Five individuals from Iran, Turkey, and UAE were charged under the Arms Export Control Act and IEEPA for attempted export of technology for Iran's ballistic missile and UAV programs. The procurement network operated from 2005 to 2013, spanning nearly a decade before detection and prosecution.
BIS-2023-ARATOSBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte StaatenCritical technologies (procurement network)
BIS issued a Temporary Denial Order (TDO) suspending export privileges of the Aratos Group, a network of defense-related companies in the Netherlands and Greece, for acting as a procurement network for Russian intelligence services. The network procured items across multiple ECN categories for sanctioned end-users.
DOJ-2023-BOGONIKOLOSNationale GerichteVereinigte StaatenQuantum computing equipment, military antennas, advanced electronics
Greek head of NATO contractor Aratos Group indicted for smuggling US-origin military technologies to Russian intelligence (SVR) and Military Unit 33949 since 2017. Technologies included quantum computing and nuclear testing equipment. He falsified end-use documentation claiming items were for 'recreational maritime vessels.' Arrested in France, extradition proceedings pending.
DDTC-2023-ISLAND-PYROBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte StaatenAmmonium perchlorate (rocket propellant oxidizer)
Island Pyrochemical Industries Corp. paid $850,000 ($425,000 suspended for compliance) for unauthorized brokering of ammonium perchlorate from China to Brazil and making false license statements. A Special Compliance Officer was appointed with independent audit requirements.
OFAC-2023-BATBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte StaatenTobacco products, equipment, and services
British American Tobacco paid $508 million to OFAC and $629 million to DOJ for 16 violations of WMD/North Korea sanctions. BAT maintained a 60% stake joint venture enabling a billion-dollar cigarette industry in North Korea with willful conduct, senior management involvement, and active concealment.
BIS-2023-SEAGATEBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte StaatenHard disk drives
BIS imposed a $300 million civil penalty - the largest standalone BIS penalty ever - on Seagate Technology for 429 violations of the EAR. Seagate continued shipping millions of hard disk drives to Huawei after Huawei was placed on the Entity List, between August 2020 and September 2021.
BIS-OFAC-2023-MICROSOFTBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte StaatenSoftware licenses and services
Microsoft paid $3.3 million in combined BIS/OFAC penalties for over 1,300 violations involving provision of software and services to SDNs, blocked persons, and sanctioned jurisdictions through its foreign subsidiaries. The case was characterized as involving reckless disregard despite self-disclosure.
BIS-DDTC-2023-3DSYSTEMSBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte StaatenAerospace blueprints, military electronics, design documents
3D Systems Corporation was fined $2.7 million by BIS and $20 million by DDTC for multiple violations including illegal shipment of U.S.-origin aerospace blueprints and military electronics to China, and controlled design documents to Germany. The company continued exports after discovering its own violations.
DOJ-2023-DTSF-FORMATIONBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte StaatenAll sensitive technologies (multi-agency enforcement)
DOJ and Commerce formed the Disruptive Technology Strike Force to target illicit acquisition of sensitive US technologies by nation-state adversaries, primarily China, Russia, and Iran. The Strike Force combines FBI agents, BIS investigators, and federal prosecutors into dedicated enforcement teams across 12 US metropolitan areas.
BIS-2022-QUICKSILVER-3DBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte StaatenTechnical drawings for satellite, rocket, and defense prototypes
Three co-located 3D printing companies (Quicksilver Manufacturing, Rapid Cut, US Prototype) received controlled technical drawings from US customers to print prototypes, then without customer knowledge, sent the drawings to Chinese manufacturers for cheaper production. Items included satellite and rocket component blueprints. BIS issued Temporary Denial Order suspending all export privileges.
DOJ-2021-THERMAL-RUSSIANationale GerichteVereinigte StaatenThermal imaging scopes and night vision goggles
Five individuals were charged in a scheme to illegally export thermal imaging scopes and night vision goggles to Russia in violation of the Arms Export Control Act. The thermal imaging equipment (classifiable under 6A003 or USML) was procured in the US and shipped to Russia through intermediaries.
DOJ-2021-THERMAL-NV-RUSSIANationale GerichteVereinigte StaatenThermal imaging scopes and night vision goggles
Five individuals were charged with conspiracy to illegally export thermal imaging scopes and night vision goggles to Russia in violation of the Arms Export Control Act. The defendants operated a procurement network purchasing equipment in the US for transshipment to Russia through intermediary countries.
BIS-2021-PHOTONICSBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte StaatenRGH-1064-30 picosecond laser systems
Photonics Industries International settled for $350,000 ($300K suspended) for exporting 25+ picosecond laser systems to China without licenses after misclassifying them as EAR99 instead of 6A005.b.6.b. The company also falsified EEI filings listing Hong Kong as the destination when true consignees were in China, including Entity-Listed Sichuan University.
DDTC-2021-HONEYWELLBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte StaatenITAR-controlled aerospace engineering drawings
Honeywell committed 34 AECA/ITAR violations by exporting engineering drawings to foreign suppliers in Canada, Mexico, Ireland, China, and Taiwan for quote requests without authorization (2011-2015). $13 million penalty ($5M suspended for compliance). Two voluntary disclosures submitted in 2016 and 2018.
DOJ-2021-SAPBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte StaatenSoftware products and cloud services
SAP admitted to thousands of illegal software exports to Iran over 7 years (2011-2017), including approximately 2,360 Iranian users accessing US-based cloud services. SAP acquired companies with inadequate compliance programs and failed to integrate them. $8 million combined penalty plus $27 million spent on compliance remediation. First Non-Prosecution Agreement under DOJ's revised VSD Policy.
BIS-2021-ENC-MASSMARKETBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte StaatenMass-market encryption items (regulatory guidance)
BIS clarified that hardware and software items meeting Note 3 mass-market criteria are classified as 5A992.c and 5D992.c rather than 5A002/5D002, removing most licensing requirements. Key criteria include: sold at retail without restriction, crypto not user-modifiable, user-installable, and designed for broad consumer market. Items like consumer routers, VPN software, and smartphones typically qualify.
BIS-2021-PRINCETONBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte StaatenAnimal pathogen strains and recombinants
Princeton University settled 37 violations for exporting controlled pathogen strains (Nov 2013-Mar 2018) to overseas research institutions in 16 countries without required licenses. Items controlled for Chemical and Biological Weapons reasons under 1C351. $54,000 penalty plus audit requirements. Self-disclosed during 2018 compliance training.
DDTC-2020-L3HARRISBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte StaatenDefense articles and technical data
L3Harris Technologies settled AECA/ITAR violations under a 36-month Consent Agreement requiring external audit and enhanced compliance measures. $13 million penalty for violations involving unauthorized exports of defense articles resulting from classification errors and licensing failures during the L3 Technologies-Harris Corporation merger integration.
DOJ-2019-POURGHANNAD-CARBONNationale GerichteVereinigte StaatenCarbon fiber (aerospace/weapons grade)
Iranian national Behzad Pourghannad sentenced to 46 months federal prison for conspiracy to procure carbon fiber from the US and divert it to Iran through third countries (2008-2013). Iran planned to use the material for centrifuge rotors and ballistic missile nose cones. Arrested in Germany in 2017, extradited to US.
DOJ-2019-OCEANWORKSNationale GerichteVereinigte StaatenNavy submarine rescue diving recompression system technical data
Canadian Navy contractor OceanWorks International and president Glen Omer Viau pled guilty to concealing transfer of US Navy submarine rescue technical data to China's PLA. $84,000 company fine plus $25,000 individual fine. OceanWorks held the contract for the Navy's SRDRS submarine rescue system and misrepresented data transfers to Commerce.
DDTC-2018-FLIRBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte StaatenInfrared cameras and thermal imaging defense articles
FLIR Systems committed 347 ITAR violations including 219 counts of unauthorized deemed exports to dual-national employees from Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, and Cuba, plus 106 license management failures and 20 counts of failing to disclose payments. $30 million penalty ($15M suspended for compliance remediation). One of the largest deemed export enforcement cases in history.
DOJ-2017-SUN-CARBON-FIBERNationale GerichteVereinigte StaatenHigh-grade carbon fiber
Chinese national Fuyi Sun sentenced to 3 years federal prison for violating IEEPA by attempting to illegally export high-grade carbon fiber to China without a license. The carbon fiber has primary applications in aerospace and military sectors including missile and aircraft construction.
DOJ-2017-ZTEBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte StaatenTelecommunications equipment and components
ZTE illegally shipped US-origin telecom equipment to Iran and North Korea, then obstructed justice by lying to investigators and failing to discipline employees involved. The $1.19 billion combined penalty (DOJ + BIS + OFAC) was the largest ever for export control violations at the time. A $300M suspended portion was later activated in 2018 when ZTE violated settlement terms by lying about employee discipline.
OFAC-2014-EPSILONBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte StaatenAuto audio equipment (Power Acoustik, Soundstream brands)
Epsilon Electronics sold $3.5 million in car audio equipment to Iran through a Dubai-based distributor (Asra International). The D.C. Circuit Court remanded the case in 2017, questioning OFAC's broad interpretation of transshipment prohibitions. OFAC rescinded the original penalty and entered a reduced $1.5 million settlement. Landmark case testing the boundaries of 'reason to know' in sanctions enforcement.
DOJ-2014-LI-FANGWEINationale GerichteVereinigte StaatenGyroscopes, accelerometers, graphite cylinders, ultra-high strength steel
Li Fangwei operated a vast network of front companies in eastern China through LIMMT Economic and Trade Company to procure materials for Iran's ballistic missile program. OFAC designated LIMMT in 2006 and Li personally in 2009. The US offered a $5 million reward for information leading to arrest. Indictment carries maximum 175 years imprisonment for charges including bank fraud and sanctions violations.
DOJ-2013-GROMACKI-CARBONNationale GerichteVereinigte StaatenT-700 high-grade carbon fiber
US citizen Peter Gromacki sentenced to 3 months federal prison for systematically transshipping US-made T-700 carbon fiber to China over six years (2006-2012). T-700 carbon fiber has aerospace and nuclear engineering applications. Despite the long duration, the relatively light sentence reflected cooperation with investigators.
DOJ-2009-HANSON-DRONESNationale GerichteVereinigte StaatenDrone autopilots
Married couple Yaming Nina Qi Hanson and Harold Dewitt Hanson indicted for conspiracy to illegally export 20 drone autopilots ($90,340) to China. Nina physically hand-carried autopilots in a suitcase through Germany to an associate who transported them to Xi'an, China. 105 days jail plus 15-year export ban for both defendants.
DOJ-2008-ROTH-UNIVERSITYNationale GerichteVereinigte StaatenPlasma actuator technology for drone wings
Retired University of Tennessee professor John Reece Roth convicted on 18 counts for sharing ITAR-controlled plasma technology (designed for Air Force drone wings) with Chinese and Iranian graduate students without authorization. First major deemed export prosecution of a university professor. At age 72, sentenced to 4 years federal prison. Supreme Court declined review.
BIS-2007-NALCOBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte StaatenWater hardness testing kits containing triethanolamine
Nalco Company fined $115,000 for 13 unlicensed exports of water testing kits containing triethanolamine, a chemical weapons precursor classified under ECCN 1C395 (mixtures containing 30%+ of 1C350 precursors). Exports went to non-CWC member countries (Bahamas, Dominican Republic, Angola).
BIS-2007-UMASSBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte StaatenAtmospheric sensing device, antennae, and cables
University of Massachusetts at Lowell exported an atmospheric testing device ($191,870) and antennae/cables ($12,480) to SUPARCO, Pakistan's space agency which was on the Entity List due to missile proliferation concerns. Both items were classified EAR99 but required licenses because of the Entity-Listed end user. $100,000 suspended penalty.
BIS-2001-SIGMA-ALDRICHBureau of Industry and Security (USA)Vereinigte StaatenBiological toxins
Sigma-Aldrich paid $1.76 million for illegal exports of biological toxins after acquiring Research Biochemicals Limited Partnership in 1997 and continuing its unlicensed exports for over a year. One of the largest biological toxin export penalties ever imposed. BIS established successor liability precedent.
INTL-1987-TOSHIBA-KONGSBERGNationale GerichteVereinigte StaatenComputer-guided propeller milling machines
Toshiba Machine (Japan) supplied eight computer-guided milling machines to the Soviet Union, combined with Kongsberg Vaapenfabrikk (Norway) numerical controls, enabling the Soviets to machine dramatically quieter submarine propellers. This violated CoCom restrictions. Two senior executives were arrested and prosecuted. The scandal led to US import sanctions on Toshiba products and directly catalyzed reform of multilateral export controls.